Abstract
Introduction
Arguably the most serious system security vulnerability in firewall-protected Intranet environments involves computers on the internal network that are also modem-connected to the public switched telephone network for convenient remote dial access. The ubiquity of modems and the ease of configuration and set-up for most remote access programs increase the likelihood that this problem will exist. Such connectivity displays grave ignorance on the part of the user since war dialing provides a trivial means for outsiders to locate such points of entry. War dialing is done via special software that will call a block of target phone numbers specified by the user. ToneLoc is an example popular war dialer O-8186-9218-9/98 $10.00 0 1998IEE
program that is available for download at ftp.paranoia.com/pub/toneloc. When the characteristic modem squeal is identified, the number is sent to a database for subsequent use. Some dialers try to login when a modem is found, using simple password guessing if authentication is present. Many security experts utilize war dialers as a means for identifying whether the inbound vulnerability exists in a target environment. In previous war dialing experiments run by the authors, modem detection has run as high as one percent of sampled number blocks in certain concentrated environments. In one very large organization for which this was done (with nearly one hundred thousand numbers called), hundreds of modems were found. Many of these were connected to computers running remote access software with no authentication.
As a result, users who presume that their remote access is hidden by simple non-advertisement of the phone number are putting their entire organization at risk. This is particularly troublesome because virtually anyone in an organization with a computer, a modem, and a telephone is equally capable of introducing this risk. This problem illustrates how important the seemingly mundane notion of security education for users is to an organization. Stiff penalties imposed by internal security organizations for anyone found with this type of configuration are strongly recommended. Figure 1 depicts the two paths in which data can flow between an Intranet and an external network such as the Internet. Path A follows a normal connection through a firewall-protected gateway. Path B, on the other hand, subverts the purpose of the firewall by going directly to a user-configured modem. It is the security risk introduced by this latter path that we address in our comments and in the preliminary experimental systems reported in this paper. 
Access
The most common means for dealing with this remote access vulnerability is to employ a stern organizational security policy, often with severe penalties for policy violators. Unfortunately, establishing Internet dial access connectivity is simple and avoids the tedious universal resource locator (URL) filtering so typical of firewall gateways. As a result, the modem problem is rarely removed by such policies.
Furthermore, the likelihood of administrators detecting outbound dial access by organizational users is minimal.
In this paper, we assume that removal of all remote access modems from a non-trivial enterprise is an intractable problem. We also presume that access to telephony infrastructure provider equipment such as signaling system computers or central office switches is not available. Our focus therefore shifts to locally controlled intrusion detection techniques for detecting whether any external intruder is exploiting this vulnerability. Specifically, we propose two functional means for local area detection of incoming war dial activity. One involves a dedicated workstation listening for incoming dial; the other involves scripts that parse PBX call records for characteristic patterns.
It should be noted that reviews and comments by colleagues on earlier drafts of this paper included suggestions for other ways in which to perform this sort of monitoring. Certain vendors, for example, have implemented clever means for dynamically searching a network for hosts running remote access software. The ODS SecureSwitch@ [l], for example, uses distance algorithms with a network discovery algorithm to detect the presence of pcAnywhere@ software actively running on some server in a local area network. We are therefore in full agreement that many techniques exist for detecting incoming war dial. We view this work as reporting practical and experimental experience with two of these techniques and we hope this helps to motivate further examination of the problem.
It should be further stated that nonterminated calls present a unique problem for any war dial detection scheme. As will be explained later in this paper, the techniques presented here may not deal adequately with this problem in all instances. More pervasive detection techniques using infrastructure elements such as telephony signaling systems work better but are generally not available to the local area manager. Additional research and development is clearly needed (and is being performed by the authors) to identify better algorithms that might close the gaps introduced by non-terminated calls.
Dedicated Workstation
Our dedicated workstation method will be presented in the context of the following issues:
l System configuration. We describe the data and voice network configuration requirements for the dedicated workstation to be used in our method.
l Implementation. We describe our Windows 95/NT-based implementation, which we call modemmon, including its NetRanger hooks.
(Readers are warned that the NetRanger features described here may not be supported by Cisco Systems by the time this paper reaches publication in the workshop proceedings.) An experimental implementation on Caldera OpenLinux@ is mentioned as well.
System Configuration
The system is configured by placing a dedicated modem-connected workstation on an unused local phone number. This selected number would not be expected to receive normal inbound voice or data traffic. Configuration requirements and heuristic considerations for such a system include the following:
Selection ofphone number. The phone number chosen must be one that would be included in a target war dial. The local private branch exchange (PBX) or Centrex service will determine which numbers are in the range. Obviously, if no spare numbers are available, then this technique will not work. Also, if only a few numbers are used, then the incoming war dial threat may not be severe enough to warrant this method of detection. The technique thus works best in a large population of local users with many unused numbers in the controlled range.
Avoidance of workstation simultaneous use. The workstation selected must not be used simultaneously for anything else considered critical to the organization, since such use would put the associated assets at risk. Also, since the technique does not require great processing power or memory, use of spare, discarded equipment is feasible and helps meet this requirement for avoiding simultaneous use. We have not done any performance analyses to date to identify any specific performance measurements.
Remote access software. Appropriate remote access software must be installed on the dedicated workstation to make the system accessible for incoming dial. Most workstation operating systems such as Windows NT, Windows 95, and Linux offer many choices in this regard (e.g., Windows RAS and Linux mgetty).
Alarm generation. Some means for creating alarms upon incoming dial complete the baseline monitoring aspect of the technique. This is trickier than it would appear. For example, if the local area network (LAN) cannot be used for alarm reporting, then after an intruder has been detected, the incoming dial connection can be dropped, a separate alarm call can be made via a modem call, and the system can resume listening for the hacker (whom we hope will reappear). If a LAN segment is available, then an intrusion detection system can be used for collecting and displaying alarms.
Honey pots. The workstation can also be set up with honey pot files and resources to keep inbound hackers interested. The presumption is that after detecting a modem with their war dialer, the hacker will try to connect to the modem with a terminal emulator program or something similar. Our initial experiments at trying to integrate honey pots suggest that port contention issues may arise in Windows-based implementations between the modem monitoring program and the honey pot listening server. It must be mentioned that care must be taken to insure that proper legal requirements are met with banner announcements and avoidance of illegal entrapment methods. Readers are advised to obtain legal counsel before deploying any sort of honey pot.
Caller-ID feature. If caller-id information is available from your telephony provider, then this is an obviously useful piece of evidence about the war dialer. All of our experimentation with this method involved the use of US Robotics modems that supported caller-id. War dialing from numbers that provide information for caller-id may also provide evidence about the experience level and seriousness of the intruder.
Detection patterns. The following different patterns of detected inbound activity might be expected with this method:
If the detected inbound remote dial is just a wrong number, then the caller will either go away or may call a small number of additional times. In this case, the caller hangs up upon receipt of the modem squeal. Any time your dedicated workstation is dialed, you should assume nonetheless that it is a war dialer. If this really is the case, then you can expect to see a subsequent computer-based attempt to log in. Lengths of time between detection and subsequent access cannot be predicted. Empirical studies to determine proper heuristics in this area will require long test periods in heterogeneous environments with varied assets. One would expect to see some activity within hours or days of the detected war dial.
If you do see a computer-based attempt to log into the dedicated workstation, then you can reasonably assume that you've been war dialed (and that the dialing entity is now interested in finding out more). Keep in mind that you might also have an insider accessing your system based on knowledge of your detection approach. If the remote caller dials the number repeatedly without logging in, then this could be either a confused fax or an improperly configured computer-generated calling station.
Implementation
We've implemented a Windows %/NT-based set-up called modemmon that answers an incoming call, hangs up the call, and logs the result. The utility can also send alarms to a Cisco NetRanger Intrusion Detection system for display on their NetDirector console. We've tried to keep things simple for users with displays and configuration screens that provide easy-to-follow status and simple set-up and control of the program's operation (see sample screens below): For alarm reporting of incoming dial, the NetRanger is notified across a LAN segment. The modemmon program will not allow any session to be established, which protects any assets on the LAN from the war dialing entity. (Note that for alarm reporting of subsequent remote connectivity with a terminal emulator program, one must be more concerned with assets that may exist on the LAN). The essence of this intrusion detection approach is that after detecting the inbound connection, a TCP/II?-based event is created on the network that the NetRanger will process and interpret as an alarm. This is a somewhat novel use of the canned signature detection capabilities of the NetRanger product. It also illustrates the clumsy interfaces that exist currently on commercial intrusion detection systems for experimentation.
In order for this scheme to work, several modifications are necessary to the NetRanger sensord.conf file to accept alarms from modemmon. The sensord.conf file on the NetRanger product defines the alarms in the system, the relative severity of the alarm, what to do with the alarm, and definitions of data sources into the sensor. This file must be modified to include the modemmon workstation as a data source as well as defining the alarm name and severity. This might be done by editing the /usr/nr/etc/sensord.conf to include a line such as the following: Note that the number 1037 in this case must be unique. We suggest finding and using the next available alarm number in your configuration file for the dedicated workstation. Also the AlarmName has to match the name entered in the modemmon configuration option. To add the alarm severity and reporting level, you might insert an entry in the file as follows:
# Interface 1 event levels SigOfFilterName 1037 0 4 4 4 4 #AlarmName
Once again the number 1037 should match the number used in the RecordOfFilterName entry. Note that the alarm severity level is 4. By default 4 will cause an alarm to be displayed as a red icon.
Using an alarm level of 3 will cause the alarm to be yellow. As a final point, we should mention that we've also experimented with a Linux-based implementation of this technique. We used an AST Bravo 486 computer running Caldera OpenLinux. The Linux mgetty program in conjunction with a caller-id equipped US Robotics modem was used to trip incoming calls and to record the time, the call, and any caller-id information that might be present. All of the architectural issues described above with respect to the Windows-based modemmon also apply to our OpenLinux-based system.
PBX Call Record Parsing
The second technique works if a local PBX is being used to generate call records (the technique can be extrapolated to infrastructure providers of Centrex services). The call records generated by the PBX, which usually include calling station, called station, and time-related information in each record, are used by most organizations for administrative and accounting purposes. The idea is that scripts can be developed that examine call record audit trails for certain patterns that may suggest inbound war dial activity. This follows traditional audit trail analysis procedures that have been in place for many years.
The algorithms in our test configuration are by no means perfect. In fact, we've only just started experimenting with fine-tunings that will better detect war dials in the logs. Nevertheless, the heuristics guiding our implementation and testing are discussed below:
One-to-many relationship. As one might expect, a one-to-many relationship between a single calling number and many (usually all) internal phone numbers is the primary indicator of war dial activity. It is not difficult to search for this pattern in a PBX call record trail. Sequential calling of internal numbers (i.e., 'OOOO', 'OOOl', '0002', and so on) should not be presumed as most war dialers allow a nonsequential shuffle mode for target numbers. Uncompleted calls may also mask one-to-many relationships.
Time between calls. For large target enterprises, we presume in our test configuration that the time between calls of interest to be shorter (e.g., on the order of seconds or minutes). This allows the intruder to get through all target numbers in a reasonable amount of time; for smaller target enterprises, the time between calls may be greater (e.g., on the order of many minutes or even hours). While this heuristic is difficult to substantiate, the best we can say is that is matches our own subjective behavior in war dialing for defensive security analysis.
User profiling. We don't do any content or time-based user profiling in our current experiments. We are examining methods for building patterns of regular incoming callers to store in a database. Billing records provide an excellent means for establishing these patterns quickly. Obviously, this technique could be extended to outgoing calls to assist in fraud detection.
Non-terminated culls. Non-terminated calls are not in the CDR log for our Lucent Definity G3 PBX. This is a serious deficiency in the approach because it creates gaps in the patterns we are searching for. If it were possible to configure the PBX to produce CDR records for all calls coming into local facility, then it would be possible to process the CDR records looking for extensions which are not currently being used. The most effective way to detect nonterminated calls is to obtain the information from the signaling system. This information is not available, however, to local area managers.
Heavy traffic loss. Due to the fact that ANI is not provided with most of the call records in the PBX trail, it is possible for war-dialing activity to be lost in higher traffic times. The processing algorithm was developed to look for calls coming into the facility nominally 30-60 seconds apart. If a high volume of calls exists, the current algorithm would not be able to identify the war-dialing calls. Tuning the call separation duration might help.
Concluding Remarks
Our comments in this paper are the result of some early experimentation with detection methods for in-bound war dialing. We fully acknowledge the immaturity of our results, especially with respect to parsing of PBX scripts. Our decision to share results in this workshop stems from our belief that this technique does work in most environments and holds tremendous promise in an area where previously none existed. It also stems from the enthusiasm we've observed in local area managers who've been introduced to this concept. We hope that by sharing our ideas in this forum, additional improvements can be identified.
We offer the following preliminary conclusions based on our on-going local area test and experimentation with the detection techniques described above:
l Our technique is certainly not ready for deployment on a wide scale because it has not been subjected to large amounts of varied, experimental data over an extended period of time. We believe that with additional test time and continued monitoring, we will begin to develop better insights into what works and what doesn't. We will report our experiences in a general forum after a sufficient knowledge base has been obtained and interpreted.
l In spite of the previous comment, the problem of incoming war dial is so severe that we can't imagine administrators not wanting to do something like what we've described above. We are considering making the modemmon utility available on our Web site so that local area managers can experiment.
l Infrastructure providers may decide, if the market demand is great enough, to offer a monitoring service such as this for war dial detection. Toll fraud detection systems might be tweaked to identify these patterns. An advantage to this approach is that signaling information might be used to deal with the non-terminated call problem.
l Extension of the intrusion detection reporting technique to additional vendor systems should be straightforward. Provision of flexible application programming interfaces (APIs) with library routines or function calls for generating alarms in commercial intrusion detection systems would greatly simplify the use of tools such as modemmon.
